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Abstract: 
 
There has been a burgeoning interest in gratitude in adults, adolescents, and children, with most 
scholars examining the relations between variations in level of gratitude, treated largely as an 
emotional state, and measures of well-being. In this paper we explain why we think that gratitude 
should be defined as a virtue, as discussed by neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists, rather than simply 
as an emotional state. Defining gratitude as a virtue has clear developmental implications (no 
child or adolescent could be considered virtuous in the Aristotelian sense), allowing us to 
consider its likely precursors. It also has cultural implications, as one might expect cultural 
variations in how gratitude is cultivated in the young. We then discuss methods we think are 
helpful in allowing an understanding of the development of gratitude, and provide some 
supportive evidence for its development in different cultural contexts. 
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Article: 
 
In truth, O judges, while I wish to be adorned with every virtue, yet there is nothing which I can 
esteem more highly than the being and appearing grateful. For this one virtue is not only the 
greatest, but is also the parent of all the other virtues. [Cicero, 54 BC/2009, p. 80] 
 
For centuries philosophers [Hume, 1739-1740; Mather, 1732; Smith, 1759/2000] and writers - 
e.g., Dickens, Great Expectations [1860-1861/1996], and Shakespeare, The Tragedy of King 
Lear [1605/2005] - have concurred with Cicero, at least considering gratitude as a virtue and 
ingratitude as an abomination. We will argue that Cicero was correct in the epigram quoted 
above, that gratitude is, in fact, a virtue. Following both philosophers [e.g., Annas, 2011; Berger, 
1975; Comte-Sponville, 2001; Kristjánsson, 2013; McConnell, 1993, 2013; Roberts, 2004] and 
psychologists [e.g., Baumgarten-Tramer, 1938; Emmons, 2009; Freitas, O'Brien, Nelson, & 
Marcovitch, 2012; Piaget, 1965/1995] who have treated gratitude as though it is a moral virtue, 
we define it as occurring when: (a) a benefactor has freely and intentionally helped or provided a 
beneficiary with something; (b) the beneficiary recognizes the benefactor's intentionality; and (c) 
the beneficiary freely chooses to repay, if at all possible and appropriate, with something the 
benefactor needs or wants. If this is a disposition on the beneficiary's part, rather than something 
that rarely is felt or acted on, this seems like a virtue, and is likely to forge or strengthen 
connections between people. 
 
By contrast, contemporary scholars interested in gratitude have largely treated gratitude as an 
emotional trait, one that positively correlates with various measures of well-being [Algoe, 2010; 
Algoe, Fredrickson, & Gable, 2013; Buck, 2004; Emmons & McCullough, 2003; McCullough, 
Tsang, & Emmons, 2004; Sheldon & Lyubomirsky, 2006]. Although there certainly is value in 
knowing the correlates of greater or lesser degrees of grateful feelings, we think that there are 
good reasons for examining gratitude as a virtue, an approach that has clear developmental 
implications. As developmental psychologists, we believe it is necessary to understand how such 
a virtue develops and the influences on its development, given that gratitude is neither innate nor 
something that emerges spontaneously in human beings [Emmons & Shelton, 2002]. 
 
Initially we will critique the way in which gratitude has primarily been studied, as an emotion, 
and then explain why we think that it makes more sense to consider it as a virtue, given the way 
in which the concept is typically defined. We will then provide a theoretical framework within 
which the development of gratitude as a virtue may be studied, before ending with a discussion 
about the ways in which we have instantiated this theory in our ongoing research. 
 
Gratitude as a Positive Emotion 
 
Social psychologists typically view gratitude as a positive state that is either correlated with well-
being or, in a few cases, is said to lead to well-being [Froh et al., 2014; Froh, Sefick, & Emmons, 
2008; Wood, Maltby, Gillett, Linley, & Joseph, 2008]. Gratitude as an emotion [Algoe, Haidt, & 
Gable, 2008], as a positive affect [Watkins, 2004], or as a “life orientation towards the positive” 
[Wood, Froh, & Geraghty, 2010, p. 892] is as likely to be felt when viewing a sunset or 
recognizing one's good health as when one is the beneficiary of a kind deed. Being grateful for a 
beautiful sight or one's good health has nothing to do with recognizing another's intentional act 
on one's behalf; nor does it permit autonomously taking on any obligation to retribute. 
 
These scholars have a very broad concept of gratitude. Those who provide a definition of the 
term commonly include in that definition: (a) the benefactor's intentionality, (b) the beneficiary's 
recognition of that intentionality, and sometimes that (c) the beneficiary should freely wish to 
repay [Froh et al., 2014; McCullough, Emmons, & Tsang, 2002; Roberts, 1991]. However, the 
way in which the concept is operationalized does not combine well with that definition and 
instead loosens connections to gratitude as a virtue. “Gratitude has been conceptualized as an 
emotion, a virtue, a moral sentiment, a motive, a coping response, a skill, and an attitude. It is all 
of these and more” [Emmons & Crumpler, 2000, p. 56]. Thus Watkins, van Gelder, and Frias 
[2009] argued that the “benefactor” could be considered a supernatural or impersonal force or 
object and that “in these cases people are implicitly appraising intentional benevolence on the 
part of the impersonal benefactor” (p. 438). According to Wood et al. [2010], gratitude 
encompasses a positive appreciation for a fairly wide range of feelings and behaviors: an 
appreciation of other people, appreciating what one has, “feelings of awe when encountering 
beauty,” behaviors that express gratitude, focusing on the positive, appreciating the fact that life 
is short, and making “positive social comparisons” [Wood et al., 2010, p. 891]. As Gulliford, 
Morgan, and Kristjánsson [2013] pointed out, it is not surprising that terminological confusion is 
often found in the psychological treatment of gratitude. 
 
This loose assessment of gratitude is reflected in the main scales that social psychologists have 
used to collect data on gratitude from adults, adolescents, or both. None of the items on the 
Gratitude Questionnaire-6 (GQ-6) [McCullough et al., 2002], which seems to be the most widely 
used scale, the Gratitude Adjective Checklist (GAC) [McCullough et al., 2002], the Gratitude, 
Resentment, Appreciation Test-Short Form (GRAT) [Watkins, Woodward, Stone, & Kolts, 
2003; see also Froh et al., 2011], or the Appreciation Scale (AS) [Adler & Fagley, 2005] take 
into account the three key attributes of gratitude as a virtue. Only three of the six GQ-6 items, 
none of the GAC items, four of the 15 GRAT items, and nine of the 81 AS items even mention 
other people's actions as a possible reason for feeling grateful, with none including the idea of 
wishing to repay, in some way, for a kindness that was done or a gift that was given. 
 
Although those who developed these scales, and those who use them in research, refer to them as 
“gratitude” scales, it is important to recognize that gratitude is not being treated as a virtue even 
when authors that used one or more of the scales initially defined the concept as including 
intentionality, recognition of that intentionality, and positive retribution as a goal. Items such as 
“I have so much in life to be thankful for” (GQ-6), to be “appreciative” (GAC), “Every Fall I 
really enjoy watching the leaves change colors” (GRAT), or “I recognize and acknowledge the 
positive value and meaning of things around me” (AS), certainly speak to a happy and 
appreciative feeling about life, but do not relate to gratitude as a virtue. 
 
Where these scales are particularly effective is in their ability to distinguish among people with 
different degrees of some composite of gratitude, appreciation, and happiness, which makes it 
easy to conduct correlational analyses of this composite with various measures of well-being. In 
fact, most studies of gratitude are not focused on whether individuals can be described as being 
grateful (having the virtue of gratitude) or not; they are concerned instead with individual 
variations in the appreciation participants say they feel for the nicer things that life has to offer. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, this type of appreciation correlates positively with well-being and 
inversely with depression, hostility, vulnerability, and various measures of psychopathology 
[Watkins, 2004; Wood et al., 2010]. Similarly, relatively simple interventions (asking people to 
reflect on five things for which they are thankful, or keeping a gratitude diary) lead to people 
scoring higher on these measures of appreciation [Emmons & McCullough, 2003; Froh et al., 
2008; Seligman, 2012; Sheldon & Lyubomirsky, 2006]. But it is unclear whether these measures 
have anything to do with gratitude as a virtue, given that none of the scale items reference any 
sense of obligation to return a favor or help. The GRAT, for example, requires participants to 
respond to four items of this type: “I couldn't have gotten where I am today without the help of 
many people.” One can agree with that statement without feeling any obligation to repay that 
help. 
 
Gratitude as a Virtue 
 
Beginning with Aristotle, virtue has been defined as “an acquired disposition to do good” 
[Comte-Sponville, 2001, p. 1]. Annas [2011] argued that a virtue is a persisting and reliable 
disposition to act in a virtuous way, a “characteristic” aspect of an individual that has been 
developed over the course of learning how to think, feel, and act virtuously. A brave person, for 
example: 
 
… is someone whose existing character tendencies have been formed in such a way that 
he acts, reasons, and reacts bravely, rather than in some other way. This is why virtue is a 
disposition which is from the start an active and developing one. [Annas, 2011, p. 10] 
 
One could easily substitute “grateful” (or any other virtue) for “brave” in this context: a grateful 
individual is one who has developed in such a way that she reasons, acts, and reacts gratefully. A 
behavioral component is thus necessarily involved, something not required by those viewing 
gratitude as an emotional state. 
 
Considering gratitude as a virtue, that is, as a persisting and reliable disposition to behave in a 
morally praiseworthy manner, distinguishes it from gratitude as a positive emotional state, or 
even as an emotional disposition (a general tendency to feel appreciative about life). That is, a 
person can feel appreciative towards or happy about a benefactor, but failing to repay that 
benefactor in some way when they need assistance suggests ingratitude rather than gratitude. 
This is not to imply that gratitude, as a virtue, does not include emotion, but it cannot be defined 
by emotion alone. Similarly, being virtuously grateful might well correlate with feelings of well-
being, as is the case for gratitude as defined as an emotional state. The reverse, however, is not 
true. Individuals scoring high in well-being should also score high on measures such as the 
GRAT or GQ-6, but would not necessarily exhibit gratitude as a virtue. 
 
The definition of gratitude as a virtue thus has three very specific features: (a) a benefactor has 
freely and intentionally helped or provided a beneficiary with something; (b) the beneficiary 
recognizes the benefactor's intentionality; and (c) the beneficiary freely chooses to repay, if at all 
possible and appropriate, with something the benefactor needs or wants. We will delineate the 
components of this definition and outline the implications of each. 
 
The first feature of gratitude as a virtue is that an individual has received help or a gift from 
another person or institution. In contrast to gratitude as a positive emotion, this definition 
requires another person or entity. This human connection, or relatedness, is distinctly different 
from a general feeling of well-being or an emotional state, neither of which need involve other 
people. 
 
The second feature of this definition of gratitude is that the individual who has received this help 
or gift from another recognizes that the other individual has freely provided something for their 
benefit (rather than being forced to do so or providing it by mistake). In order to have gratitude, 
one must be paying attention and be cognitively aware enough to know that one has been given 
something of value by the benefactor and that this person freely intended to provide the benefit. 
Infants, for example, have not achieved the cognitive capacity to appreciate the help they 
receive. Cognitive capability, though necessary, is not sufficient. Even a dispositionally grateful 
person may, on occasion, fail to notice that another individual has provided aid for his or her 
benefit. For example, I may clean up a spill in the bathroom so no one slips but those who next 
enter may neither be aware of the spill nor of my kind deed and so feel no sense of gratitude. 
Therefore, the first two requirements of this definition of gratitude as a virtue include another 
person, as well as awareness of that other person and his or her efforts. 
 
The final prerequisite for gratitude as a virtue is that the beneficiary freely chooses to repay, if at 
all possible and appropriate, with something the benefactor needs or wants. A heart-felt “thank 
you” may be all that is necessary at the time of receiving the gift or help, but seeing the 
benefactor in need of help and ignoring the opportunity for helping them is surely a sign of 
ingratitude. There are, however, three qualifiers to this obligation to repay: (a) the individual 
must freely choose to repay; (b) it must be possible and appropriate to repay; and (c) the 
repayment should be something the benefactor needs or wants. We will expand upon each of 
these qualifiers. 
 
The first is that this obligation must be autonomously accepted - that is, the beneficiary has to 
freely take on the obligation and not be forced to do so (i.e., heteronomous obligation) if the 
response is to be seen as virtuous. This casts doubt on Watkins' [2014] argument that feeling an 
obligation to repay (something that Watkins seems to assume involves heteronomy) is 
necessarily at odds with gratitude. It may still be the case that autonomously taking on an 
obligation to retribute might cause some difficulties, but, as Comte-Sponville wrote: “Gratitude 
is the most pleasant of virtues, though not the easiest” [2001, p. 132]. 
 
The second qualifier is that there is an obligation to repay in the event that repayment is possible 
and appropriate. Calling someone grateful does not mean that she always responds in 
appropriately grateful ways in conditions under which gratitude seems appropriate. As 
Hursthouse [2013] noted, to be virtuous is not an “all or none” issue. If this is true for virtues 
such as honesty (one can still be considered an honest individual even when not telling the truth 
when asked by a friend whether this new dress she just bought makes her look fat) or bravery 
(one can be thought brave even when retreating in the face of insurmountable odds) it is even 
more true of gratitude. One can have received great help but an opportunity to repay the favor 
might never present itself. Lack of retribution in such circumstances would not mean that one 
was not grateful (although on occasion such a debt can be repaid by helping others as a way to 
compensate for an inability to repay the benefactor). 
 
Thus one can encounter situations in which a grateful person does not behave gratefully. One 
could have an opportunity to retribute appropriately in a specific situation but fail to do so 
because of temporary forgetfulness, being distracted, or a rival and more pressing claim 
[McConnell, 2015]. It is important to recognize that the obligation to retribute, if at all possible, 
is not some clear rule for how to behave, but requires a thoughtful assessment of the situation. 
 
Thoughtful assessment is important. Becoming virtuous is analogous to learning a skill, 
according to Aristotle [Annas, 2011; Russell, 2015], but it is not the same as mastering a 
technique or a set response. A set of rules, such as assessing the monetary value of the help or 
gift and repaying it, or always providing a gift of equal value in exchange in some tit-for-tat 
fashion, is not an example of gratitude as a virtue. To be a virtue, the activity of acquiring it has 
to lead to understanding when it is appropriate to use and when not, and then to use the virtue 
appropriately without necessarily having to think about it. Aristotle likened having a virtue to 
being a skilled builder who, through dint of much practice and experience, can create novel 
buildings without having to waste much energy considering the most mundane aspects of placing 
one brick above another [Russell, 2015]. The difference, he noted, is that one judges the builder 
by the objects created, but the virtuous individual in terms of her actions. The relation between a 
virtue and Aristotle's concept of phronesis (practical wisdom) then becomes clear, as does the 
argument for why young children, even when saying “thank you,” cannot be said to have the 
virtue of gratitude. Gratitude is something that may be acquired over the course of development, 
by being actively engaged in its practice. Possessing a virtue means being able to explain what it 
means to have that virtue - someone would hardly be considered grateful if she simply acted in a 
grateful way (following some type of tit-for-tat rule, for example) but had no idea about why she 
should act that way - even though the virtuously grateful person will feel and express gratitude 
without having to work through the appropriate reasoning each time. Like a builder who relies on 
the skills developed in building different constructions to determine what is needed to build a 
new construction, so a grateful person uses practical wisdom, acquired in the course of past 
experience, to know how and when to appropriately express that gratitude. 
 
In terms of the final qualifier, gratitude requires repayment with something of value to the 
benefactor. In order to possess or develop gratitude as a virtue, a prerequisite is the cognitive 
ability to take another's perspective. Young children are less able than those who are older to 
understand that another individual can have preferences that differ from their own. For example, 
a young child may be given assistance from an adult and chooses to repay with a teddy bear, an 
object of desire to the child, but likely not to the adult. 
 
Thus, many of the features of gratitude in this sense are clearly not present in early childhood; 
gratitude, as a virtue, must develop from humbler beginnings. One of those beginnings is being 
persuaded to say “thank you” for a gift, something that many parents work hard to get their 
children to say, once “mama,” “dada,” and “bye-bye” have been mastered by their offspring 
[Visser, 2009]. But to understand a benefactor's intentionality, to be able to think about what that 
benefactor might appreciate in response, and to be able to act autonomously, requires at a 
minimum a good deal of cognitive and socio-emotional development. It also requires being in 
contexts in which gratitude is expressed by people whom the children or adolescents see as 
appropriate models and explanations about why expressing gratitude is a good thing to do, and 
why failure to do so shows ingratitude, something to be avoided. 
 
A Theoretical Approach to Studying Developmental Precursors of Gratitude 
 
From a developmental perspective, it is worth noting that human beings, as members of a social 
species, at least have the potential to develop gratitude. As scholars such as de Waal [2006, 
2010] and Warneken and Tomasello [2009] have suggested, nonhuman primates such as 
chimpanzees seem to exhibit gratitude in rudimentary ways and children during the second year 
of life seem predisposed to help others in some circumstances [Carlo, 2014; Killen & Smetana, 
2015; Narvaez, 2015; Thompson, 2015]. In ontogenesis, the earliest precursor may simply be a 
beneficiary feeling good when being helped or given a gift. Somewhat later, the beneficiary 
might experience a positive emotional response not only to the gift or help, but also to the 
benefactor's action and then to the benefactor him- or herself, and even later the idea might arise 
that it could be good to give something back to the benefactor. Finally, the beneficiary might 
develop the cognitive capacity and socio-emotional wherewithal to wish to repay, if at all 
possible, with something assumed to be of interest or need to the benefactor, and wish to do so if 
and when an opportunity presents itself. Not surprisingly, development of this type of gratitude, 
a virtuous act, needs time, experience, and, perhaps, encouragement. 
 
What are the relevant factors that influence the development of this virtue? There is no single 
cause that should be sought; as with all human development, multiple, interrelated, factors, 
working synergistically, need to be studied. This position is not new [see Pepper, 1942 for his 
discussion of the “contextualist” paradigm], but recent years have seen rich theoretical grounding 
and compelling empirical evidence supportive of this complex paradigm [Bronfenbrenner, 2001; 
Lerner & Overton, 2008; Michel, 2014; Overton, 2015; Sameroff & Mackenzie, 2003; Tudge, 
2008; Witherington, 2014], perhaps better termed the relational developmental systems paradigm 
[Lerner, 2015]. 
 
There are four interrelated factors, discussed separately here for heuristic purposes, that seem 
particularly relevant to the development of gratitude. The first, and most immediately relevant, is 
what Bronfenbrenner [Bronfenbrenner, 2001; Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 2006] termed “proximal 
processes,” or the typically occurring everyday activities and interactions in which the 
developing individuals of interest engage. The second relates to the personal characteristics of 
the individuals and their common social partners, including (and most relevant for our current 
purposes) a child's level of cognitive development - for what one expects of someone in terms of 
understanding, feeling, and expressing gratitude varies greatly depending on that level, at least 
during childhood and adolescence. The third factor has to do with the contexts in which everyday 
activities and interactions take place, both local (where gifts and help are proffered, and under 
what conditions) and cultural (the current values and beliefs about gift- and help-giving and 
responses considered appropriate in any given cultural group). The fourth and final factor is time 
- both ontogenetic and socio-historical. As children reach adolescence and then enter adulthood 
we should expect changes in their understandings, feelings, and expression of gratitude. Along 
with changes during ontogenesis, values (including those related to the expression of gratitude) 
in any given culture undergo changes over time, for example, as the extent or form of education 
changes, or as the economy grows or shrinks. Thus in cultural groups undergoing rapid social 
change one should consider the combination of both ontogenetic and socio-historical changes on 
the expression of gratitude. 
 
These four factors are clearly interrelated; cultural values do not determine the expression of 
gratitude any more than level of cognitive development does, and everyday activities and 
interactions are always influenced simultaneously by the interacting individuals' personal 
characteristics and by the contexts of which they are a part - contexts that are themselves 
constantly undergoing change. 
 
Everyday Activities and Interactions 
 
Key to development is what Bronfenbrenner termed “proximal processes,” what cultural 
developmentalists [e.g., Cole & Cagigas, 2010; Rogoff, 2003] call “cultural practices,” and what 
Tudge [2008] referred to as “everyday activities and interactions.” This, of course, fits well with 
an Aristotelian approach to virtue ethics, which is not only a developmental approach but one 
that stresses the importance of repeated engagement in the practice of exercising the virtue 
[Annas, 2011; Russell, 2015]. For virtue ethicists, one develops a virtue by engaging in relevant 
activities, initially in a simple way but in conjunction with more skilled others, just as a 
composer is likely to have started practicing scales with a more competent teacher. As Annas 
stated: “What has emerged from examining the acquiring of virtue is that virtue itself is an 
essentially developmental notion” [2011, p. 38]. 
 
As with the learning of all skills, however, it is the missteps, as well as the activity done 
correctly, that aid growing understanding. Sometimes children hear people expressing thanks for 
things that are not gifts (after they have received help to do something, or emotional comfort), 
and on other occasions expressions of thanks are not forthcoming in what seem to be identical 
circumstances. Children are helped, to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the social context, 
to understand when it is appropriate to express (and to feel) gratitude, but mostly they do so by 
trying out the words, seeing what works and what does not. Gratitude, then, like any virtue, 
needs to be practiced in order for it to become a part of us, but children get help from those 
around them in the course of their everyday activities and interactions with others, particularly 
with others who are more competent in the prevailing culturally approved practices. Froh et al. 
[2014] found evidence that children from 8 to 11 not only scored significantly higher than they 
had in a pretest on a gratitude scale, but also were more likely to help others, following a very 
brief intervention designed to encourage attention to the thoughtfulness of a benefactor. Similar 
encouragement, over an extended period of time, by a parent, teacher, or friend might be 
expected to have a greater impact. As Annas [2011] stated, “Virtue is understood in part by the 
way it is learnt, and that it is learnt always in an embedded context - a particular family, city, 
religion, and country” (p. 52). 
 
Although everyday activities and interactions around gift- and help-getting, the encouragement 
of expressing gratitude, and coming to feel it spontaneously are the driving forces for its 
development, those activities and interactions are heavily influenced both by the personal 
characteristics of the interacting individuals and by the contexts, both local and cultural, in which 
those activities and interactions occur. 
 
Personal Characteristics 
 
Given the definition of gratitude as a virtue, it is essential that one is able to think logically, take 
another's perspective, and act autonomously in order to engage in gratitude. Prosocial feelings, 
such as feeling empathy for others, recognizing prosocial actions on the part of others, and 
wanting to cooperate, are also likely to be preconditions. There is increasing evidence [for 
reviews see Carlo, 2014, and Killen & Smetana, 2015] that during the first year of life infants 
show more interest in puppets that have acted prosocially than in those that have acted in 
antisocial ways. During the second year of life, infants show concern for others who seem to be 
hurt, try to help those who appear in need, and even show rudimentary evidence for preferring 
fair to unfair distribution of resources. Although such prosocial tendencies might be part of what 
makes us human [Narvaez, 2015; Thompson, 2015], there are clearly individual differences in 
the extent to which these tendencies are displayed, and parental child-rearing practices seem 
relevant. Parents' controlling, heteronomy-inducing practices are negatively related to their 
young children's prosocial behaviors, whereas those practices that are supportive and autonomy-
inducing are positively related [Carlo, 2014]. 
 
During the early school years children become increasingly able to take others' points of view as 
they recognize that others may see the world differently than they themselves do [Killen & 
Smetana, 2015], and by middle childhood children are increasingly able to understand others' 
intentionality, even in fairly complex situations [Jambon & Smetana, 2014]. They also, 
particularly thanks to having parents who are supportive rather than controlling, or spending time 
with peers, are more likely to develop autonomous, rather than heteronomous, notions about 
moral judgments [Dunn, 2014; Grusec, Chaparro, Johnston, & Sherman, 2014; Piaget, 
1965/1995]. 
 
Adolescents are increasingly able to reason abstractly, allowing them to consider possible 
outcomes and consequences of behavior, to think more broadly and critically about the society in 
which they live and its place in the world. Piaget thus wrote that they can construct “a scale of 
values that also goes beyond the restricted circle of [their] immediate surroundings,” and are able 
to construct “theories that make it possible for [them] to judge or to perfect the society around 
[them]” [Piaget, 1965/1995, p. 299]. The propensity to enact change can be seen in their attempts 
to construct a better, fairer, society, particularly when encouraged to engage in service-learning 
activities [Flanagan, Kim, Collura, & Kopish, 2015; Hart, Matsuba, & Atkins, 2008; Lerner, 
2015; Yates & Youniss, 1999]. Adolescents also become increasingly exposed to values, quite 
possibly different from those of their parents and teachers, from the media with which they 
interact - television, Internet, and books [Carr & Harrison, 2015]. 
 
Context: Local 
 
Although children's age-related experiences involving interactions with others around gift- and 
help-getting are important, so too are the contexts in which children are raised. The local 
contexts, what Bronfenbrenner [2001] termed microsystems, are important to the development of 
gratitude because it is there, where the developing children are situated, that they are most 
obviously engaged in relevant activities and interactions. Children are not only at home, where 
the parents are the source of authority, but in school, where other rules are enforced, and where 
children have greater opportunity to engage in conflict, and resolve those conflicts, with peers 
[Tudge & Winterhoff, 1993]. They are also more likely to spend at least some time away from 
adult authority, and be only in the company of peers, where they will be exposed to different 
views about what counts as right and wrong. 
 
The ideas of Annas [2011] are particularly relevant here. She noted that a virtue, to escape being 
merely parochial or relativistic (i.e., what is normatively done in my group constitutes a virtue), 
must allow for the development of a critique of one's familial ideas of what is virtuous, and even 
of one's sociocultural group. Otherwise, a child would only learn the specific qualities of 
character considered virtuous within his or her culture at the current historical time and would 
not be able to reflect critically on those virtues. The appropriation of a virtue must mean more 
than simply mimicking the virtues of those around them. As Annas commented, children may 
first learn to be honest, for example, in the context of their family, but then come to realize that 
their family members are not always honest. Her argument is that children are thus part of at 
least two communities - their family and the community of those they consider honest, and the 
latter might not coincide 100% of the time with the former. “We can think of a progressive 
enlargement of understanding as a progressive enlargement of the shared community” [Annas, p. 
56]. Not everyone does that, of course: “Rather than deal with the fact that our family is 
dishonest, our country jingoistic, the values we have learnt inadequate, we make rationalizations, 
or simply refuse to face facts” [Annas, p. 57]. Although Annas does not make this point, the fact 
that children grow up in more settings than simply their own family (they are in relatives' or 
friends' houses, exposed to different ideas and practices through the media, in books, and in 
school, and with their peers) makes this questioning process easier. 
 
Context: Cultural 
 
While the local contexts in which children and adolescents spend their time are relevant to the 
development of gratitude, so too are the cultural contexts of which they are a part. Parents', 
teachers', and friends' values regarding gratitude and their beliefs about how and when gratitude 
should be expressed are related to their cultural group. Visser [2009] described the different 
conditions under which different cultural groups consider saying “thank you” for something is 
warranted. 
 
One promising avenue that should be explored further when considering cultural influences on 
the development of gratitude is Kağitçibaşi's [2007, 2012] work on autonomy-relatedness. 
Gratitude as a virtue requires individuals to autonomously accept the obligation to repay, if 
appropriate and possible. However, the very act of repaying a benefactor with something valued 
by that person also builds or strengthens relations between the two individuals. 
 
Kağitçibaşi [2007] proposed that there are two orthogonal value dimensions for parental 
socialization, one having to do with agency and the other with interpersonal distance. Along the 
vertical axis, parents encourage their children to be relatively autonomous or relatively 
heteronomous (or obedient to their parents and others). Along the horizontal axis parents vary in 
the extent to which they encourage their children to be separate from others or more related to 
others. Some cultures, traditionally termed collectivist, stress obedience to elders (rather than 
autonomy) and close connections to the group. Other cultures, traditionally termed 
individualistic, are strongly encouraging of autonomy, but less so of close connections with the 
group. Of most interest to the study of the virtue of gratitude is a third group of cultures, in 
which parents encourage both autonomy and relatedness. This group, Kağitçibaşi argued, is to be 
found in urban areas of the “majority world” (where the majority of the world's children live) 
among educated parents. (Kağitçibaşi argued that the fourth group, in which heteronomy and 
separation are valued, is rarely found.) 
 
We suspect, in fact, that the socialization of values is more complex than Kağitçibaşi [2007, 
2012] implies, and that even in the industrialized world, cultural groups can be found that also 
value autonomy-relatedness and, indeed, heteronomy-relatedness [see, for example, Kohn, 1995; 
Luster, Rhoades, & Haas, 1989; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Siraj & Mayo, 2014; 
Tamis-LeMonda et al., 2008; Tudge et al., in press]. The essential point, however, is that the 
cultural group into which children are born also has a profound influence on the extent to which 
children are encouraged to think about others (relatedness) and to act autonomously 
(reciprocation, or even just thanking others, because one feels that it is the right thing to do rather 
than because one has been told to). 
 
Historical Time 
 
It is impossible to consider culture-related values without taking into account changes over 
historical time. In fact, Kağitçibaşi's [2007, 2012] work is an excellent example of this. As she 
pointed out, families with little or no education living in rural parts of the majority world raise 
their children with heteronomous-related values. However, as people move into cities, where the 
traditional ways may not be so relevant but where educational possibilities may become more 
widely available, values may begin to change. As Kağitçibaşi and Ataca [2005] showed in their 
study of three generations, urban and educated parents in the majority world are likely to still 
want to raise their children to feel connected to the group but also to make their own decisions 
about their future, particularly with reference to their education and occupation (autonomous-
related). 
 
In other words, in both the majority world and the industrialized world there is differential 
encouragement from parents for children to act in more heteronomous or autonomous ways. 
These cultural contextual factors, and changes over historical time in the cultures themselves, 
have to be considered as well as children's ontogenetic development in making sense of the 
development of gratitude. For children to take on an autonomous obligation to repay a benefactor 
is neither as simple as the developmental move from unilateral respect and a heteronomous sense 
of obligation to mutual respect and autonomous obligation, nor as straightforward as growing up 
in cultural groups that differentially encourage autonomy and relatedness. 
 
In summary, this paradigm, as a basis for studying the development of gratitude, privileges 
everyday interactions involving opportunities to feel gratitude in principle (the receipt of gifts or 
help) and its actual feeling and expression. The extent to which these types of interactions 
happen and the ways in which gratitude is felt and expressed are heavily influenced by individual 
and contextual factors, as well as by changes occurring over historical time. Individual factors 
have to do with the child's level of development and other age-related experiences. Contextual 
factors can be considered at both the local level (for example, the extent to which the child 
receives help and gifts, and how much encouragement and modelling is provided by the child's 
parents, teachers, siblings, friends, and so on) and at the distal level (the extent to which the 
culture as a whole values and supports the expression of gratitude). Cultural values and beliefs 
about the appropriate ways for people of different ages to express gratitude are far from 
unchanging, however. 
 
Appropriate Methods to Study the Development of the Virtue of Gratitude 
 
How can this paradigm be instantiated? We will illustrate this by reference to our ongoing 
research on the development of gratitude, with funding generously provided by the John 
Templeton Foundation. It should be clear from the preceding description that it would make little 
sense, given how we have defined gratitude, to use any of the measures most commonly used by 
scholars interested in the concept, broadly considered. Instead we have used three approaches 
that, we think, better assess children's developing understanding of gratitude. 
 
The first is an adaptation of the approach used by the first scholar interested in the development 
of gratitude, Franziska Baumgarten-Tramer [1938]. She initially asked her Swiss 7- to 15-year-
old participants to write what their greatest wish was, and then asked what they would do for the 
person who granted them that wish. She thus did not try to assess the emotional state of gratitude 
or measure how grateful her respondents said they were, but to tie their expression of gratitude to 
a benefactor having granted them their wish. 
 
Based on these children's responses, Baumgarten-Tramer [1938] classified gratitude into three 
primary types: verbal, concrete, and connective. She found that verbal gratitude (expressing one's 
thanks, which could be simply an expression of politeness, as Freitas, Pieta, and Tudge [2011] 
noted) did not vary greatly with age, although it was most likely to be expressed by the 15-year-
olds. The younger children in her sample were most likely to say that they would repay their 
benefactor with a gift, money, a hug, and so on. Baumgarten-Tramer termed this type of 
response “concrete gratitude” and noted that although those expressing concrete gratitude view 
retribution as important, the response is essentially egocentric, not taking account of what the 
benefactor might actually like or need. For example, a child who wished for a new dollhouse 
might offer to give the benefactor a doll. Baumgarten-Tramer found that this type of gratitude 
declined between ages 7 and 15. By contrast, what she termed “connective gratitude” increased 
across this age range. Children expressing this type of gratitude not only recognize that 
repayment of a gift or help is necessary, but also that what is done should be something that is 
helpful or appropriate to the benefactor. 
 
This approach allows us to assess the extent to which there are age-related differences in the type 
of gratitude children and adolescents say that they express when given something they perceive 
to be of value as well as take into account the proximal effect of the particular relationship with 
the benefactor. In line with Baumgarten-Tramer's [1938] results, we found no consistent increase 
or decrease in the extent to which 7- to 14-year-olds expressed verbal gratitude in samples in the 
United States, Brazil, Russia, or China, but in general concrete gratitude was less likely to be 
expressed with age whereas older participants were more likely to express connective gratitude 
than were those who were younger [Freitas et al., 2011; Tudge, Freitas, Mokrova, & Wang, 
2015a; Tudge, Freitas, Mokrova, Wang, & O'Brien, 2015b; Wang, Wang, & Tudge, 2015]. 
 
Our second approach is to ask our participants to respond to vignettes in which one character 
helps another and subsequently is in need of assistance. The respondents are asked to explain 
how the characters in the story feel and what, if anything, the recipient of help should do. 
Although this approach does not allow assessment of the different types of gratitude that children 
and adolescents may express, it permits us to judge whether or not they think that repaying a 
favor or help is something that should be done, as well as understand their reasoning. The results 
of a recent study suggested that the majority of the children attributed positive feelings to the 
beneficiary and valued the benefactor's action (helping the beneficiary), but not the benefactor 
him- or herself [Rava & Freitas, 2013]. However, there were age differences in the manner in 
which the children understood the obligation to return a favor to a benefactor: (a) the 5- to 6-
year-old children focused primarily on the negative consequences that a failure to repay would 
have on the benefactor (for example, she would be sad); (b) this type of response was less likely 
among older children; (c) returning a favor as a heteronomous obligation (for example, to ensure 
that the beneficiary was not viewed as ungrateful or rude) was most common among children 
aged 7 and older; (d) repayment as a moral good, or as an autonomous obligation (for example, 
that it is good to repay or it is good to make the benefactor happy) was only found among some 
of the 11- to 12-year-olds [Castro, Rava, Hoefelmann, Pieta, & Freitas, 2011; Rava & Freitas, 
2013]. 
 
The same vignettes were used with the 5-year-olds in a longitudinal study with children between 
ages 3 and 5, and the results indicated, as expected, that the ability to recognize emotions and tie 
them appropriately to social situations is important for the understanding of the most basic 
aspects of gratitude - that the beneficiary has to feel positively, to tie that positive feeling with 
the benefit received, and to understand the benefactor's mental state (namely that the benefactor 
has intentionally acted to fulfill his or her need or desire). The results of this study suggest that 
children with a better early understanding of emotions and mental states understand more about 
gratitude. Mental state knowledge at age 4 mediated the relation between emotional knowledge 
at age 3 and gratitude understanding at age 5 [Nelson et al., 2013]. 
 
Our third approach is to use two measures that assess both the extent to which children feel that 
they have been helped or given things and how grateful to their benefactor they feel. One 
measure is a questionnaire, with responses on a 5-point scale ranging from “never” to “yes, 
always”; the other uses the same questions, but in the form of an interview allowing our 
respondents to go into more depth in their answers. These measures provide a more detailed 
portrayal regarding their cognitive processes related to gratitude. These data are as yet 
unanalyzed. 
 
In order to understand the everyday interactions related to gratitude we interviewed parents, 
asking them about their perceptions of the extent to which their children feel and express 
gratitude, the conditions under which they are most (and least) likely to express it, what, if 
anything, the parents do to try to encourage gratitude, and how they try to do that. We also 
interview the children about their perceptions of how likely they are to receive gifts or help from 
others. 
 
As they are part of the local context most relevant to the formation and development of gratitude, 
the parents are also asked about how much they feel like they themselves are helped, and the 
extent to which they feel and express gratitude, to help us understand why parents might 
differentially encourage the expression of gratitude in their children and whether there is any link 
between parents' and children's gratitude. One major factor that could influence the extent to 
which, and the manner in which, parents try to encourage feelings and expressions of gratitude is 
the cultural group in which the families are situated. To assess the cultural context that may be 
the most relevant to the development of gratitude, we collect our data from sociocultural groups 
that we think differ in terms of Kağitçibaşi's [2007] orthogonal dimensions of autonomy-
heteronomy and separation-relatedness, both within the United States (groups distinguished in 
terms of both race/ethnicity and social class) and from other societies (including Brazil, Russia, 
and China). The parents also provide information on the extent to which they value the 
development of autonomy and relatedness in their children [Liang, Mokrova, & Tudge, 2015; 
Tudge et al., 2015c]. 
 
The age-related differences we described in the types of gratitude expressed are important, but so 
too are the cultural variations. Chinese 7- and 8-year-olds were more likely than any other group 
to indicate that they would express verbal gratitude when receiving something that they really 
wanted. No fewer than 70% of their responses were of this type, whereas only between 15 and 
40% of the responses of same-age children in the other societies featured verbal gratitude [Tudge 
et al., 2015b]. Among our Brazilian participants, the percentage of responses that included verbal 
gratitude increased from about 15-30% among the younger children, to about 45-60% of all 
responses among 13- to 14-year-olds. By contrast, although the Russian children until about age 
11 were more likely than those in the United States to express verbal gratitude (around 40-50% 
of responses compared to 20-30% in the US sample), the older children in these countries 
expressed very similar amounts of this type of gratitude (between 30 and 40%). If it is the case 
that verbal gratitude is simply a reflection of being taught to be polite when receiving something 
one wished for, younger Chinese children were more than twice as likely as their counterparts in 
Brazil or the United States to be polite [Tudge, Freitas, Mokrova, & Wang, 2015a]. 
 
Regarding concrete gratitude, the most interesting cross-cultural differences were that the 
American children, of all ages, were the most likely to express concrete gratitude (with more 
than 50% of the responses of 7-year-olds being of this type) and the Russian children, at least 
from the age of 9 and older, were consistently least likely (20% of responses) to express this type 
of gratitude. The Brazilian children fell between these two groups. In other words, there were 
similar age differences across these four groups; however, they differed by the age of their 
tipping points. In the case of China, however, fewer than 15% of the responses of the 7-year-olds 
were of concrete gratitude, with little variation across age. These younger Chinese children were 
much more likely to express verbal gratitude and much less likely to express concrete gratitude 
than were children in the other countries. 
 
We have argued that connective gratitude, by taking into account the wishes and feelings of the 
benefactor, thereby strengthening the relationship, best qualifies as a virtue. We were interested 
to know, therefore, whether there was any evidence of this type of gratitude in children, whether 
it was more commonly expressed among older children, and whether children in different 
cultures might express this type of gratitude to different extents. 
 
Several things are worth noting. First, between 15 and 30% of the responses of 7- to 8-year-olds 
from each of the societies where we collected data were examples of connective gratitude; the 
expression of this type of gratitude is thus not only found in young adolescents. Second, 11- to 
14-year-old Russian youth were most likely to express this type of gratitude (around 60% of their 
responses), and 10- to 13-year-old Chinese youth were similarly likely to express connective 
gratitude (around 50% of their responses). Finally, although Brazilian 7- and 8-year-olds were 
more likely than any other same-age group to express this type of gratitude (a little over 30% of 
their responses), there was no increase in expressions of connective gratitude among older 
children, as there was in the Russian, Chinese, and American samples [Tudge, Freitas, Mokrova, 
& Wang, 2015a]. 
 
Thus it seems clear that the precursors for the development of gratitude as a virtue are present in 
children at least as young as 7. Moreover, the cultural variability that we found suggests that 
culture-wide sets of child-rearing values and beliefs have an influence on how children respond 
to being given something. If it is the case that culture-wide values influence children's responses 
to help and gifts, it is most likely that the parents are one of the important mediating factors. Are 
Chinese parents, for example, more likely than those in other societies to stress to their young 
children the importance of thanking? Do Russian and Chinese parents exemplify more 
collectivist or relatedness values, thereby encouraging their youth to think about others, rather 
than have them focus on the individual? Do American parents, by focusing more on the gifts 
themselves than on the people providing those gifts, encourage their children to think in terms of 
reciprocating with gifts rather than on strengthening relationships? 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Much of the recent work on gratitude has come from social psychologists who have provided 
evidence that children, adolescents, and adults who score higher on measures of gratitude also 
score higher on various measures of well-being. This is important work; we want people to feel 
grateful, appreciative, and happy for the experiences they have. If, by writing gratitude journals 
or reflecting on all that one has to be grateful for, one's feelings of well-being increase, then we 
should certainly encourage it. However, we think that the term “gratitude” has been loosened too 
much. Is it really the same feeling (a) to be thankful that one owns many possessions; as (b) to 
look at the beautiful autumn foliage on a sunny day; as (c) to be appreciative of the fact that one 
has lived a full life and still enjoys good health; as (d) to feel a moral obligation to do something 
for a benefactor? 
 
A different approach is to define the term as have some philosophers and psychologists - as a 
self-imposed moral obligation to repay, if at all possible, a benefactor in some way that is helpful 
or pleasurable to that benefactor. If an individual has developed the disposition to commonly 
take on this moral obligation in response to being intentionally and freely provided some benefit, 
it seems reasonable to think of that individual as being grateful, and to view him or her as having 
the virtue of gratitude. 
 
As developmental psychologists it is essential to ask: how do individuals develop this virtue? 
Baumgarten-Tramer [1938] was the first to analyze age-related patterns of responses and 
identified three major types of gratitude, types that she termed verbal, concrete, and connective, 
each of which represented a more sophisticated type of gratitude. In work conducted recently in 
different countries (Brazil, China, Russia, and the United States) similar patterns of responses 
were found as Baumgarten-Tramer had in Switzerland. Responding to a question about what 
children or adolescents would do when someone granted their greatest wish should not be taken 
as evidence that they would either act that way in reality or that responding with connective 
gratitude means that they are virtuous individuals. However, one can say that feeling and 
expressing connective gratitude is a necessary (though by no means sufficient) precursor to 
developing the virtue of gratitude. 
 
At least in the 7- to 14-year-old age group that we have studied, there seem to be age-related 
differences in the expression of these types of gratitude, particularly in the case of concrete 
gratitude (which was exhibited more by our younger than older participants) and connective 
gratitude (which was expressed more frequently by older participants). Differences with age 
were not so clearly seen in the case of verbal gratitude. Although the 13- and 14-year-olds were 
more likely to express connective gratitude than were the younger ones, many did not. Similarly, 
although more younger than older children expressed concrete gratitude, there was a good deal 
of individual variability. It is therefore worth conducting research to understand the source of 
these individual variations, some of which are most likely related to the everyday experiences 
and interactions around gift- and help-giving and how partners in those activities (particularly 
parents, but also peers and teachers) act and express themselves. 
 
If parents and other social partners have an influence on the ways in which children develop the 
feeling and expression of gratitude, then culture must play a large part in this, given that parents' 
approaches to socialization are culturally related. It is thus not sufficient to study the 
development of gratitude in a single society or recruit members of just one cultural group as 
participants. Although the age-related patterns that we found in the expression of different types 
of gratitude were not restricted to a single society, there were some striking differences, 
particularly from the Chinese participants. 
 
We should be cautious, of course, about the fact that our data were only gathered from a single 
city in each of the four societies. Without replication from different regions and/or different 
racial/ethnic groups within each society we are unable to ascertain whether the society-related 
differences that we found are more widespread or specific to the particular region in which we 
collected our data. Regardless of whether or not our findings can be generalized to other parts of 
each country, more work is clearly needed in order to understand the reasons for the society-
related differences that we found and, as we have argued, this involves interviewing parents. 
 
If parents have an impact on how their children react upon receiving help or a gift, then the next 
step is to understand what they are currently doing to influence their children's feelings and 
expressions of gratitude. Then, if we wish to encourage the development of gratitude as a virtue, 
we need to find ways to persuade them to focus less on the gift itself and more on the giver. In 
other words, we should not only think of gratitude as being the parent of all virtues, as Cicero 
stated, but also what parents can do to ensure that gratitude as a virtue is developed in their 
children. 
 
Acknowledgment 
 
An earlier version of this paper was presented by the first two authors at the Varieties of Virtue 
Ethics conference at Oriel College, Oxford, in January 2015; we benefitted greatly from the 
interesting presentations and discussions in which we participated. We would also like to express 
our gratitude to the John Templeton Foundation (grant #43510) who provided very generous 
support for our research on gratitude, and to the children and parents who participated in our 
studies. The second author thanks Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e 
Tecnológico - CNPq (grant # 301714/2012-6). 
 
References 
 
Adler, M.G., & Fagley, N.S. (2005). Appreciation: Individual differences in finding value and 
meaning as a unique predictor of subjective well-being. Journal of Personality, 73, 79-
114. doi:10.1111/ j.1467-6494.2004.00305.x Pubmed/Medline (NLM) Crossref (DOI) 
Algoe, S. (2010). Find, remind, and bind: The functions of gratitude in everyday 
relationships. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 6, 455-469. 
doi:10.1111/lj.1751-9004.2012.00439.x Crossref (DOI) 
 
Algoe, S., Fredrickson, B., & Gable, S. (2013). The social functions of the emotion of gratitude 
via expression. Emotion, 13, 605-609. doi:10.1037/a0032701 Pubmed/Medline (NLM) 
Crossref (DOI) 
 
Algoe, S.B., Haidt, J., & Gable, S.L. (2008). Beyond reciprocity: Gratitude and relationships in 
everyday life. Emotion, 8, 425-429. doi:10.1037/1528-3542.8.3.425 Pubmed/Medline 
(NLM) Crossref (DOI) 
 
Annas, J. (2011). Intelligent virtue. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
 
Baumgarten-Tramer, F. (1938). “Gratefulness” in children and young people. Journal of Genetic 
Psychology, 53, 53-66. doi:10.1080/08856559.1938.10533797 Crossref (DOI) 
 
Berger, F.R. (1975). Gratitude. Ethos, 85, 298-309. doi:10.1086/291969 Crossref (DOI) 
 
Bronfenbrenner, U. (2001). The bioecological theory of human development. In N.J. Smelser & 
P.B. Baltes (Eds.), International encyclopedia of the social and behavioral sciences. Vol. 
10 (pp. 6963-6970). New York, NY: Elsevier. doi:10.1016/B0-08-043076-7/00359-4 
Crossref (DOI) 
 
Bronfenbrenner, U., & Morris, P.A. (2006). The bioecological model of human development. In 
W. Damon (Series Ed.) & R.M. Lerner (Vol. Ed.), Handbook of child psychology. Vol. 
1 (6th ed., pp. 793-828). New York, NY: John Wiley. Crossref (DOI) 
 
Buck, R. (2004). The gratitude exchange and the gratitude of caring: A developmental-
interactionist perspective of moral emotion. In R.A. Emmons & M.E. McCullough 
(Eds.), The psychology of gratitude (pp. 100-122). New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/ 9780195150100.003.0006 Crossref (DOI) 
 
Carlo, G. (2014). The development and correlates of prosocial moral behaviors. In M. Killen & 
J.G. Smetana (Eds.), Handbook of moral development (2nd ed., pp. 208-234). New York, 
NY: Psychology Press. doi:10.4324/9780203581957.ch10 Crossref (DOI) 
 
Carr, D., & Harrison, T. (2015). Educating character through stories. Exeter, UK: Imprint 
Academic. 
 
Castro, F., Rava, P.G.S., Hoefelmann, T.B., Pieta, M.A.M., & Freitas, L.B.L. (2011). Deve-se 
retribuir? Gratidão e dívida simbólica na infância [Should one return a favor? Gratitude 
and symbolic debt in childhood]. Estudos de Psicologia [Studies of Psychology], 16, 75-
82. doi:10.1590/S1413-294X2011000100010 
 
Cicero (2009). Pro Plancio. Retrieved from http://perseus.uchicago.edu/perseus-
cgi/citequery3.pl?dbname=LatinAugust2012&getid=1&query=Cic.%20Planc.%2080#80. 
(Original work published in 54 BC.) 
 
Cole, M., & Cagigas, X.E. (2010). Cognition. In M. Bornstein (Ed.), Handbook of cultural 
developmental science (pp. 127-142). New York, NY: Psychology Press. 
 
Comte-Sponville, A. (2001). A small treatise on the great virtues: The uses of philosophy in 
everyday life. New York, NY: Holt and Company. 
 
de Waal, F. (2006). Our inner ape: A leading primatologist explains why we are who we 
are. New York, NY: Riverhead Books. 
 
de Waal, F. (2010). The age of empathy: Nature's lessons for a kinder society. New York, NY: 
Harmony Books. 
 
Dickens, C. (1996). Great expectations. London, UK: Penguin Books. (Original work published 
in 1860-1861.) 
 
Dunn, J. (2014). Moral development in early childhood, and social interaction in the family. In 
M. Killen & J.G. Smetana (Eds.), Handbook of moral development (2nd ed., pp. 135-
159). New York, NY: Psychology Press. doi:10.4324/9780203581957.ch7 Crossref 
(DOI) 
 
Emmons, R.A. (2009). Greatest of the virtues? Gratitude and the grateful personality. In D. 
Narvaez and D. Lapsley (Eds.), Personality, identity, and character: Explorations in 
moral psychology (pp. 256-270). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
doi:10.1017/CBO9780511627125.012 Crossref (DOI) 
 
Emmons, R.A., & Crumpler, C.A. (2000). Gratitude as a human strength: Appraising the 
evidence. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 19, 56-69. 
doi:10.1521/jscp.2000.19.1.56 Crossref (DOI) 
 
Emmons, R.A., & McCullough, M.E. (2003). Counting blessings versus burdens: An 
experimental investigation of gratitude and subjective well-being in daily life. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 377-389. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.84.2.377 
Pubmed/Medline (NLM) Crossref (DOI) 
 
Emmons, R.A., & Shelton, C.M. (2002). Gratitude and the science of positive psychology. In 
C.R. Snyder & S.J. Lopez (Eds.), Handbook of positive psychology (pp. 459-471). 
London, UK: Oxford University Press. 
 
Flanagan, C.A., Kim, T., Collura, J., & Kopish, M.A. (2015). Community service and 
adolescents' social capital. Journal of Research on Adolescence, 25, 295-309. 
doi:10.1111/jora.12137 Crossref (DOI) 
 
Freitas, L.B.L., O'Brien, M., Nelson, J.A., & Marcovitch, S. (2012). A compreensão da gratidão 
e teoria da mente em crianças de 5 anos [The understanding of gratitude and theory of 
mind in 5-year-olds]. Psicologia: Reflexão e Crítica, 25, 330-338. doi:10.1590/S0102-
79722012000200015 Crossref (DOI) 
 
Freitas, L.B.L., Pieta, M.A.M., & Tudge, J.R.H. (2011). Beyond politeness: The expression of 
gratitude in children and adolescents. Psicologia: Reflexão e Crítica, 24, 757-764. 
doi:10.1590/S0102-79722011000400016 Crossref (DOI) 
 
Froh, J.J., Bono, G., Fan, J., Emmons, R.A., Henderson, K., Harris, C., Leggio, H., & Wood, 
A.M. (2014). Nice thinking! An educational intervention that teaches children to think 
gratefully. School Psychology Review, 43, 132-152. 
 
Froh, J.J., Fan, J., Emmons, R.A., Bono, G., Huebner, E.S., & Watkins, P. (2011). Measuring 
gratitude in youth: Assessing the psychometric properties of adult gratitude scales in 
children and adolescents. Psychological Assessment, 23, 311-324. doi:10.1037/a0021590 
Pubmed/Medline (NLM) Crossref (DOI) 
 
Froh, J.J., Sefick, W.J., & Emmons, R.A. (2008). Counting blessings in early adolescents: An 
experimental study of gratitude and subjective well-being. Journal of School Psychology, 
46, 213-233. doi:10.1016/ j.jsp.2007.03.005 Pubmed/Medline (NLM) Crossref (DOI) 
 
Grusec, J.E., Chaparro, M.P., Johnston, M., & Sherman, A. (2014). The development of moral 
behavior from a socialization perspective. In M. Killen & J.G. Smetana (Eds.), Handbook 
of moral development (2nd ed., pp. 113-134). New York, NY: Psychology Press. 
doi:10.4324/9780203581957.ch6 Crossref (DOI) 
 
Gulliford, L., Morgan, B., & Kristjánsson, K. (2013). Recent work on the concept of gratitude in 
philosophy and psychology. Journal of Value Inquiry, 47, 285-317. doi:10.1007/s10790-
013-9387-8 Crossref (DOI) 
 
Hart, D., Matsuba, M.K., & Atkins, R. (2008). The moral and civic effects of learning to serve. 
In L.P. Nucci & D. Narvaez (Eds.), Handbook of moral and character education (pp. 
484-499). New York, NY: Routledge. Crossref (DOI) 
 
Hume, D. (1739-1740). A Treatise of Human Nature. Retrieved from 
http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/authors/hume. 
 
Hursthouse, R. (2013). Virtue ethics. In E.N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of 
philosophy. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/ethics-
virtue/. 
 
Jambon, M., & Smetana, J.G. (2014). Moral complexity in middle childhood: Children's 
evaluations of necessary harm. Developmental Psychology, 50, 22-33. 
doi:10.1037/a0032992 Pubmed/Medline (NLM) Crossref (DOI) 
 
Kağitçibaşi, C. (2007). Family, self, and human development across cultures: Theory and 
applications. New York, NY: Psychology Press. 
 
Kağitçibaşi, C. (2012). Sociocultural change and integrative syntheses in human development: 
Autonomous-related self and social-cognitive competence. Child Development 
Perspectives, 6, 5-11. Crossref (DOI) 
 
Kağitçibaşi, C., & Ataca, B. (2005). Value of children and family change: A three-decade 
portrait from Turkey. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 54, 317-337. 
doi:10.1111/j.1464-0597.2005. 00213.x Crossref (DOI) 
 
Killen, M., & Smetana, J.G. (2015). Origins and development of morality. In M. Lamb 
(Ed.), Handbook of child psychology. Vol. 3 (7th ed., pp. 701-749). New York, NY: 
Wiley/Blackwell. doi:10.1002/ 9781118963418.childpsy317 Crossref (DOI) 
 
Kohn, M.L. (1995). Social structure and personality through time and space. In P. Moen, G.H. 
Elder, Jr., & K. Lüscher (Eds.), Examining lives in context: Perspectives on the ecology 
of human development (pp. 141-168). Washington, DC: American Psychological 
Association. doi:10.1037/10176-004 Crossref (DOI) 
 
Kristjánsson, K. (2013). An Aristotelian virtue of gratitude. Topoi, 34, 499-511. 
doi:10.1007/s11245-013-9213-8 Crossref (DOI) 
 
Lerner, R.M. (2015). Promoting positive human development and human justice: Integrating 
theory, research, and application in contemporary developmental science. International 
Journal of Psychology, 50, 165-173. doi:10.1002/ijop.12162 Pubmed/Medline (NLM) 
Crossref (DOI) 
 
Lerner, R.M., & Overton, W.F. (2008). Exemplifying the integrations of the relational 
developmental system: Synthesizing theory, research, and application to promote positive 
development and social justice. Journal of Adolescent Research, 23, 245-255. 
doi:10.1177/0743558408314385 Crossref (DOI) 
 
Liang, Y., Mokrova, I., & Tudge, J. (2015, October). Developing the RASH (Relatedness, 
Autonomy, Separation, Heteronomy): An improvement on Kagitcibasi's measure of 
autonomy-relatedness. Presented as part of the symposium “The Development of 
Gratitude in Context” at the biennial meetings of the Society for the Study of Human 
Development, Austin, TX. 
 
Luster, T., Rhoades, K., & Haas, B. (1989). The relation between parental values and parenting 
behavior: A test of the Kohn hypothesis. Journal of Marriage and Family, 51, 139-147. 
doi:10.2307/352375 Crossref (DOI) 
 
Mather, S. (1732). An essay concerning gratitude. Boston, MA: Hancock. 
 
McConnell, T. (1993). Gratitude. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. 
 
McConnell, T. (2013). Gratitude. In H. LaFollette (Ed.), International encyclopedia of 
ethics. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons. doi:10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee325 
Crossref (DOI) 
 
McConnell, T. (2015, January). Gratitude, virtue, and moral lapses. Presentation at the third 
annual conference for the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, Oxford, UK. 
 
McCullough, M.E., Emmons, R.A., & Tsang, J. (2002). The grateful disposition: A conceptual 
and empirical topography. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 112-127. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.82.1.112 Pubmed/Medline (NLM) Crossref (DOI) 
 
McCullough, M.E., Tsang, J., & Emmons, R.A. (2004). Gratitude in intermediate affective 
terrain: Links of grateful moods with individual differences and daily emotional 
experience. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 295-309. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.86.2.295 Pubmed/Medline (NLM) Crossref (DOI) 
 
Michel, G.F. (2014). A developmental psychobiological approach to human 
development. Research in Human Development, 11, 37-49. 
doi:10.1080/15427609.2014.874764 Crossref (DOI) 
 
Narvaez, D. (2015). The co-construction of virtue: Epigenetics, development, and culture. In 
N.E. Snow (Ed.), Cultivating virtue: Perspectives from philosophy, theology, and 
psychology (pp. 251-277). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Crossref (DOI) 
 
Nelson, J.A., Freitas, L.B.L., O'Brien, M., Calkins, S.D., Leerkes, E.M., & Marcovitch, S. 
(2013). Preschool-aged children's understanding of gratitude: Relations with emotion and 
mental state knowledge. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 31, 42-56. 
doi:10.1111/j.2044-835X.2012.02077.x Pubmed/Medline (NLM) Crossref (DOI) 
 
Overton, W.F. (2015). Process and relational developmental systems. In W.F. Overton & P.C. 
Molenaar (Eds.), Handbook of child psychology and developmental science: Theory and 
method. Vol. 1 (7th ed., pp. 9-62). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons. Crossref (DOI) 
 
Oyserman, D., Coon, H.M., & Kemmelmeier, M. (2002). Rethinking individualism and 
collectivism: Evaluation of theoretical assumptions and meta analyses. Psychological 
Bulletin, 128, 3-72. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.128.1.3 Pubmed/Medline (NLM) Crossref 
(DOI) 
 
Pepper, S.C. (1942). World hypotheses: A study in evidence. Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press. Crossref (DOI) 
 
Piaget, J. (1995). Sociological studies. New York, NY: Routledge. (Original work published in 
1965.) 
 
Rava, P.G.S., & Freitas, L.B.L. (2013). Gratidão e sentimento de obrigatoriedade na infância 
[Gratitude and the feeling of obligation in childhood]. Psico-USF, 18, 383-394. 
doi:10.1590/S1413-82712013000300005 Crossref (DOI) 
 
Roberts, R.C. (1991). Virtues and rules. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 51, 325-
343. doi:10.2307/2108130 Crossref (DOI) 
 
Roberts, R.C. (2004). The blessings of gratitude: A conceptual analysis. In R.A. Emmons & 
M.E. McCullough (Eds.), The psychology of gratitude (pp. 58-78). New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195150100.003.0004 Crossref 
(DOI) 
 
Rogoff, B. (2003). The cultural nature of human development. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Russell, D.C. (2015). Aristotle on cultivating virtue. In N.E. Snow (Ed.), Cultivating virtue: 
Perspectives from philosophy, theology, and psychology (pp. 17-47). New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press. Crossref (DOI) 
 
Sameroff, A.J., & Mackenzie, M.J. (2003). Research strategies for capturing transactional 
models of development: The limits of the possible. Development and Psychopathology, 
15, 613-640. doi:10.1017.S0954579403000312 Pubmed/Medline (NLM) Crossref (DOI) 
 
Seligman, M.E.P. (2012). Flourish: A visionary new understanding of happiness and well-
being. New York, NY: The Free Press. 
 
Shakespeare, W. (2005). The tragedy of King Lear. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press. (Original work published in 1605.) 
 
Sheldon, K.M., & Lyubomirsky, S. (2006). How to increase and sustain positive emotion: The 
effects of expressing gratitude and visualizing best possible selves. Journal of Positive 
Psychology, 1, 73-82. doi:10.1080/17439760500510676 Crossref (DOI) 
 
Siraj, I., & Mayo, A. (2014). Social class and educational inequality: The impact of parents and 
schools. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139086387 
Crossref (DOI) 
 
Smith, A. (2000). The theory of moral sentiments. New York, NY: Prometheus. (Original work 
published in 1759.) 
 
Tamis-LeMonda, C.S., Way, N., Hughes, D., Yoshikawa, H., Kalman, R.K., & Niwa, E.Y. 
(2008). Parents' goals for children: The dynamic coexistence of individualism and 
collectivism in cultures and individuals. Social Development, 17, 183-209. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9507.2007.00419.x Crossref (DOI) 
 
Thompson, R.A. (2015). The development of virtue: A perspective from developmental 
psychology. In N.E. Snow (Ed.), Cultivating virtue: Perspectives from philosophy, 
theology, and psychology (pp. 279-306). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Crossref (DOI) 
 
Tudge, J.R.H. (2008). The everyday lives of young children: Culture, class, and child rearing in 
diverse societies. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
doi:10.1017/CBO9780511499890 Crossref (DOI) 
 
Tudge, J., Freitas, L., Mokrova, I., & Wang, Y. (2015a, March). The development of gratitude in 
American, Brazilian, Russian, and Chinese 7- to 14-year-olds. Paper presented at the 
biennial meetings of the Society for Research in Child Development, Philadelphia, PA. 
 
Tudge, J.R.H., Freitas, L.B.L., Mokrova, I.L., Wang, Y.C., & O'Brien, M. (2015b). The 
expression of gratitude and materialism in youth. Paidéia, 25, 281-288. 
doi:10.1590/1982-43272562201501 Crossref (DOI) 
 
Tudge, J.R.H., Martins, G.D.F., Merçon-Vargas, E.A., Dellazzana-Zanon, L.L., Piccinini, C.A., 
& Freitas, L.B.L. (in press). Children, families, and communities in Brazil: A cultural-
ecological approach to child-rearing values and practices. In C. Højholt (Vol. Ed.) and M. 
Fleer & B.V. Oers (Eds.), International handbook on early childhood education. New 
York, NY: Springer. 
 
Tudge, J., Mokrova, I., Freitas, I., Seidl-de-Moura, M., Kiang, L., Payir, A., & Liang, Y. (2015c, 
March). Developing a new scale to assess autonomy-relatedness: The Related 
Autonomous Separate Heteronomous (RASH) scale. Presentation at the biennial meetings 
of the Society for Research in Child Development, Philadelphia, PA. 
 
Tudge, J.R.H., & Winterhoff, P.A. (1993). Vygotsky, Piaget, and Bandura: Perspectives on the 
relations between the social world and cognitive development. Human Development, 
36, 61-81. doi:10.1159/000277297 Crossref (DOI) 
 
Visser, M. (2009). The gift of thanks: The roots and rituals of gratitude. Boston, MA: Houghton-
Mifflin. 
 
Wang, D., Wang, Y.C., & Tudge, J.R.H. (2015). Expressions of gratitude in children and 
adolescents: Insights from China and the United States. Journal of Cross-Cultural 
Psychology, 46, 1039-1058. doi:10.1177/0022022115594140 Crossref (DOI) 
 
Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M. (2009). Varieties of altruism in children and 
chimpanzees. Trends in Cognitive Science, 13, 397-402. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2009.06.008 
Pubmed/Medline (NLM) Crossref (DOI) 
 
Watkins, P.C. (2004). Gratitude and subjective well-being. In R.A. Emmons & M.E. 
McCullough (Eds.), The psychology of gratitude (pp. 167-192). New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press. doi:10.1093/ acprof:oso/9780195150100.003.0009 Crossref (DOI) 
 
Watkins, P.C. (2014). Gratitude and the good life: Toward a psychology of appreciation. New 
York, NY: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-94-007-7253-3 Crossref (DOI) 
 
Watkins, P.C., van Gelder, M., & Frias, A. (2009). Furthering the science of gratitude. In S.J. 
Lopes & C.R. Snyder (Eds.), Oxford handbook of positive psychology (2nd ed., pp. 437-
445). London, UK: Oxford University Press. 
doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195187243.013.0041 Crossref (DOI) 
 
Watkins, P.C., Woodward, K., Stone, T., & Kolts, R.L. (2003). Gratitude and happiness: 
Development of a measure of gratitude, and relationships with subjective 
wellbeing. Social Behavior and Personality, 31, 431-452. doi:10.2224/sbp.2003.31.5.431 
Crossref (DOI) 
 
Witherington, D.C. (2014). Self-organization and explanatory pluralism: Avoiding the snares of 
reductionism in developmental science. Research in Human Development, 11, 22-36. 
doi:10.1080/ 15427609.2014.874763 Crossref (DOI) 
 
Wood, A.M., Froh, J.J., & Geraghty, A.W.A. (2010). Gratitude and well-being: A review and 
theoretical integration. Clinical Psychology Review, 30, 890-905. 
doi:0.1016/j.cpr.2010.03.005 Pubmed/Medline (NLM) Crossref (DOI) 
 
Wood, A.M., Maltby, J., Gillett, R., Linley, P.A., & Joseph, S. (2008). The role of gratitude in 
the development of social support, stress, and depression: Two longitudinal 
studies. Journal of Research in Personality, 42, 854-871. doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2007.11.003 
Crossref (DOI) 
 
Yates, M., & Youniss, J. (1999). Roots of civic identity: International perspectives on community 
service and activism in youth. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
